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REVIEW

The Liberalism of Love
Sharon R. Krauset
Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice
Martha C. Nussbaum. Belknap, 2013. Pp 1, 397.
INTRODUCTION
Liberal political theory has always had something of an allergy to love. Whereas liberalism rests on universal principles of
right, love tends to be particularistic in its focus. While liberalism seeks cool-headed fairness in the representation of reasonable interests, love can be hot-headed and inflammatory. Love
presupposes controversial conceptions of the good that liberalism (especially political liberalism)1 relegates to the private
sphere. And liberalism means to eschew dependence on motivations as elevated as love, preferring instead the more prosaic
motives of self-interest and respect for persons. Against this
background, Professor Martha C. Nussbaum's full-throated call
for love as a necessary support for liberal democracy is striking.
Her new book, PoliticalEmotions: Why Love Matters for Justice,
acknowledges how strange this idea will sound to liberal ears
(pp 4-6, 387-88). To her credit, however, Nussbaum presses
ahead, leading a charge that opens up important new terrain for
contemporary liberalism even if it does not always persuade.
Political Emotions brings together Nussbaum's political
theory (her "capabilities approach" and her defense of political
liberalism)2 with her work in the philosophy of emotion. 3 The
t
1

Professor of Political Science, Brown University.
See generally John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia 1996).
2
See, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities:The Human Development Approach 31-36 (Belknap 2011) (presenting the "capabilities approach,"
which holds that respect for human dignity requires ensuring an adequate threshold of
certain central capabilities); Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership 92-95 (Belknap 2006) (arguing that the capabilities approach sheds light on some problems for political liberals, including problems of justice
for people with mental disabilities, of transnational justice, and of justice for nonhuman
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book responds to what she sees as a "Problem in the History of
Liberalism" (p 1), namely that liberal political philosophy has
had little to say about "the psychology of the decent society" (p 4)
and especially about the role that emotions play within it. All
liberal-democratic societies committed to justice need to "ensure
their stability over time" and "to guard against division and hierarchy" (p 3). To achieve these ends they must rely on a range
of emotions. On one level, the book is a study of the different
types of emotion that are needed among citizens to reinforce the
attachment to reasonable political norms that stabilizes a just
society or a society aspiring to justice. It means to identify the
right political emotions and the right mechanisms for their cultivation, given the normative commitments of a properly conceived liberal democracy and the principled constraints of political liberalism. These commitments and constraints preclude the
cultivation of emotion in ways that would be "illiberal and dictatorial" (p 5). Indeed, the core challenge of the book in this respect is to show how political emotions can be fostered through
leadership, education, government policy, and culture without
running afoul of key liberal principles such as pluralism and
personal autonomy. Nussbaum advocates an activist role for
both the state and civil associations in the cultivation of political
emotions, but she insists that the emotions being cultivated
must serve liberal political principles and that this cultivation
must take place within a broader cultural context that allows for
dissent and the protection of individual liberties (pp 5-7).
If the book is in one sense a general effort to understand
why political emotions are necessary and how they may legitimately be cultivated in liberal democracies, in another sense it
is a very specific defense of love as the political emotion par excellence. Although Nussbaum investigates "a family of interrelated emotions, such as compassion, grief, fear, anger, hope" and
"the spirit of a certain sort of comedy," as well as shame and
animals); Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism, 39
Phil & Pub Aff 3, 42 (2011) (contrasting political liberalism with perfectionist liberalism).
3
See, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence
of Emotions 4 (Cambridge 2001) (exploring the relationship between emotion and judgment); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic
Ethics 3-12 (Princeton 1994) (exploring how Hellenistic philosophers-particularly Epicureans, Skeptics, and Stoics-viewed the emotions); Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from
Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law 13-18 (Princeton 2004) (arguing that public
policies based on the emotions of disgust and, to a lesser extent, shame are "profound
threats to the existence and stability of a liberal political culture" because they prevent
us from realistically assessing our own humanity).
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disgust, she holds that all the core emotions needed for liberal
democracy are tied to love in a constitutive way (p 15). This is
the radical heart of the book. The claim is radical both in associating all political emotions with love and in arguing that liberaldemocratic justice depends on love. Political Emotions thus has
two distinctive aims: first, the general effort to show that emotions are important in politics and how they should be cultivated, and secondly, the specific defense of love as a condition of
justice. The two aims are in principle separable, and one might
agree with what Nussbaum has to say about the first while resisting her views on the second. Indeed, while the evidence and
examples she brings to bear offer rich support for the idea that
certain kinds of emotions matter a great deal in liberaldemocratic politics, the book offers less compelling support for
the defense of love per se. In what follows, I give a brief overview
of the book followed by an assessment of Nussbaum's treatment
of love and some suggestions for how the view defended in Political Emotions might fruitfully be extended by making a place for
a faculty of affective impartiality.
I. THE CASE FOR POLITICAL EMOTIONS
After diagnosing the problem in the history of liberalism
that the book means to remedy (liberalism's inattention to emotions), Nussbaum embarks on a characteristically erudite and
illuminating voyage through intellectual history, this time with
an emphasis on modern thinkers, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Gottfried Herder, Auguste Comte, John Stuart
Mill, the Indian novelist Bankimchandra Chatterjee, the Indian
philosopher Rabindranath Tagore, and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's opera, The Marriageof Figaro. This first part of the book
includes three chapters intended to show that political principles in every society "need emotional support" (p 2). Nussbaum
is particularly interested here in "public emotions," which "take
as their object the nation, the nation's goals, its institutions and
leaders, its geography, and one's fellow citizens seen as fellow
inhabitants of a common public space" (p 2). No liberal society
can sustain itself for long or achieve its aspirations if its people
are not committed to its constitutive principles and to one another as citizens. To sustain this commitment, something like a
"civil religion" is needed to marshal and channel citizens' emotional energies. In contrast to the accounts of civil religion found
in Rousseau and Comte, however, which err in being excessively
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homogenizing and coercive, contemporary liberal societies can
take inspiration from Mill and Tagore, who envisioned emotional supports for political community that allowed for greater diversity and more individual freedom (p 112).
In Part Two Nussbaum takes up the question of what political principles and institutions citizens' emotions ought to serve,
and then goes on to identify some psychological sources of salutary political emotions as well as several psychological obstacles
to them. The political principles and institutions she identifies
are standard liberal-democratic ones, and they are part of "a
family of liberal political conceptions" that includes John
Rawls's theory of justice as fairness and Nussbaum's own "'capabilities' approach" (p 118). Taken together, they emphasize
the equal "opportunities of people to live rich and rewarding
lives" (pp 118-19) in addition to "[a] vigilant critical culture"
(p 124). Part Two also includes a chapter on compassion as a
psychological source of political emotions, citing scientific studies of both animals and human beings that show that the capacity for concern for others runs deep in us but that it tends to be
narrow in scope (pp 137-60). "Thus one task of any political use
of compassion will be to create stable structures of concern that
extend compassion broadly" (p 145). Another chapter draws on
experimental psychology to investigate psychological obstacles
to the kinds of political emotions that are good for liberal society,
focusing on narcissism (pp 168-74), projective disgust (pp 18286), acquiescence to peer pressure (pp 191-93), and the tendency
to obey authority uncritically (pp 193-98). In seeking to cultivate political emotions that support liberal democracy, then, we
need to do more than just extend the capacity for compassion. It
will also be necessary to mitigate these forms of what Nussbaum, following Immanuel Kant, refers to as "radical evil"
(p 166).
Part Three moves on to consider the content of the public
emotions that liberal democracy needs and the mechanisms by
which they may legitimately be cultivated. This part includes
chapters on teaching patriotism; on fostering compassion
through public festivals; on managing fear, envy, and shame;
and on how love matters for justice. The sources that Nussbaum
engages here are remarkably diverse, ranging from the rhetoric
of Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King Jr (pp 229-39) to
FDR's use of artfully constructed photographs to garner support
for the New Deal (pp 282-84), from the Stoicism of Marcus Au-
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relius (pp 222-24) to the political activism of Gandhi (pp 24246), from contemporary debates over the colors and imagery of
the Indian flag (pp 239-41) to public art in Chicago's Millennium Park and American Supreme Court decisions regarding the
pledge of allegiance (pp 215, 299). The public emotions she identifies as especially salient for liberal democracies today include
patriotism (with a critical edge), compassion, "the spirit of tragedy and the spirit of comedy" (p 201) (which respond productively to the sense of loss and the tendency toward projective disgust), and love. These emotions can be cultivated
through many strategies: through public artworks, monuments, and parks, through the construction of festivals and
celebrations, through songs, symbols, official films and photographs, through the structure of public education, through
other types of public discussions, through the public use of
humor and comedy, even by shaping the public role of
sports. (p 203)
If done right, the state's cultivation of the public emotions it
needs can proceed without obstructing critical inquiry, pluralism, or individual freedom.
Nussbaum does a great service in showing as a general matter that liberal theory's allergic reaction to emotions is misplaced. Along the way, she offers insightful accounts of the ways
that both tragic and comic arts can serve contemporary political
life, and of how important cultural resources are for sustaining
democratic citizenship. Political Emotions is also a wonderful
example of comparative political theory. Nussbaum's engagement with Indian culture, politics, and philosophy alongside the
Western canon and examples drawn from American public life
extends liberal theory in important and unexpected ways. Hopefully it will inspire more philosophers and political theorists to
look beyond the West for resources in addressing the perennial
challenges of political life. Finally, her careful attention to the
empirical study of human psychology and her richly drawn illustrations of how public emotions can be fostered in practice offer
a valuable model of political theory as an intellectual enterprise
that is deeply engaged with the real world. Her account of public
emotions is structured by a set of political ideals, but it is by no
means idealized. It means to address political societies, such as
our own, that aspire to justice without having fully achieved it.
Nussbaum has her eyes wide open to the many failures of actual
liberal democracies today and to the frailty and fallibility of ac-
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tual human beings. Yet she has high hopes for liberal democracy, and she means to encourage us on the path to more fully just
societies. One of the great strengths of Political Emotions is this
ability to be both realistic and aspirational.

II.

ASSESSING THE ARGUMENT: CURRENT DEBATES AND THE

ROLE OF LOVE

Although the book takes up themes that have been at the
center of multiple fields in recent years, it engages little of the
relevant contemporary literatures. As a meditation on the civic
sources and moral psychology of democratic citizenship, for example, Political Emotions converges with the very large literatures on civic engagement, civic virtue, civic education, and patriotism developed by political theorists and philosophers over
the last twenty-five years, 4 but none of this work is mentioned.

4
See, for example, Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a
MulticulturalDemocracy 277-79 (Harvard 2000) (arguing that public policy, particularly
education policy, should go to greater lengths to encourage citizens to support civic values and goals for the sake of sustaining and enhancing liberalism); Stephen Macedo,
Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism26576, 284 (Oxford 1990) (arguing that the political virtues citizens of liberal states must
endorse in their public lives, such as tolerance, necessarily shape the things they value
in their private lives to the extent that their personal moral commitments are often subordinate to civic values and needs); William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues,
and Diversity in the Liberal State 8-10 (Cambridge 1991) (arguing that, far from being
neutral toward varying conceptions of the good life, liberalism itself "rest[s] on a distinctive conception of the human good" that supplies considerable unity to the moral allegiances of otherwise diverse liberal citizens); Amy Gutmann, DemocraticEducation 28791 (Princeton 1987) (arguing that schooling in liberal democracies should include "political education," which involves nurturing certain skills, knowledge, and virtues that prepare children for political participation, in order to preserve democracy across generations); Rob Reich, Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education219
(Chicago 2002) (proposing a "liberal theory of multicultural education" emphasizing the
cultivation of autonomy, respect, and civic virtue rather than liberal neutrality); Eamonn
Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy 215-20 (Oxford
2004) (arguing that public education should endeavor to inculcate children with an appreciation for liberal virtues, particularly reasonableness and "pluralistic moral dialogue"); Anna Stilz, Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation,and the State 22-25 (Princeton
2009) (arguing, contra cosmopolitan theories critiquing citizenship and nationalism as
illiberal, that because states are the only institutions capable of providing for equality of
freedom-a valuable service--citizenship itself provides sufficient grounds for special
allegiance to the state and one's fellow citizens); William E. Connolly, Pluralism 5-10
(Duke 2005) (advocating the cultivation of deep, multidimensional pluralism-pluralism
across multiple zones of social and personal lives-fashioned through local meetings,
church organizations, and education); Stephen K. White, The Ethos of a Late-Modern
Citizen 105 (Harvard 2009) (arguing that wealthy Western democracies should adopt an
"ethos of democratic citizenship" stressing respect for other people and "presumptive
generosity," rather than mere tolerance).
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The central puzzle of the book, which Nussbaum describes as
the tension between cultivating a common ethos of citizenship
and protecting pluralism and individual freedom (pp 5-6), has
been widely discussed in that literature. The theme of emotions
and politics also has generated a great deal of attention in the
last decade (some of it inspired by Nussbaum's own earlier
work),5 but again virtually none of the relevant work is discussed. Finally, the claim that love is a necessary support for
democratic justice calls to mind the extensive literature on the
ethics of care as applied to politics,6 but it is as if this literature

5 See, for example, Michael Walzer, Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism 126 (Yale 2004) (arguing that liberal theory should have greater appreciation for the importance of emotions-as opposed to dispassionate reasonableness-in
shaping political associations and decision making); George E. Marcus, The Sentimental
Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics 7-8 (Pennsylvania State 2002) (arguing that rationality is enabled by emotionality, making good citizenship dependent upon citizens'
emotional faculties); George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and PoliticalJudgment 1-2 (Chicago 2000) (drawing on neuroscience
and experimental psychology to argue that most citizens react to familiar political events
and issues habitually and emotionally-unconsciously relying on earlier judgments-but
perform novel evaluations when confronted with new or threatening political situations);
Cheryl Hall, The Trouble with Passion:Political Theory beyond the Reign of Reason 12627 (Routledge 2005) (arguing that liberal democracy requires passions among the citizenry embracing liberal goods); Christina H. Tarnopolsky, Prudes,Perverts and Tyrants:
Plato'sGorgias and the Politics of Shame 193-94 (Princeton 2010) (arguing that "Platonic respectful shame" has a place in discursive politics by encouraging both democratic
debate and genuine care for others, perhaps even more effectively than emotions like
love); Barbara Koziak, Retrieving PoliticalEmotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender 17778 (Pennsylvania State 2000) (arguing that contemporary liberal theory neglects the role
played by emotions in political life, instead placing too much emphasis on self-interest as
the source of political motivation); Michael E. Morrell, Empathy and Democracy: Feeling,
Thinking, and Deliberation158 (Pennsylvania State 2010) (arguing that empathy must
play a central role in order for deliberative democracy to properly function because it is
necessary for making collective decisions that give equal weight to the needs of all citizens); Davide Panagia, The Political Life of Sensation 1-4 (Duke 2009) (contending that
individuals' political lives are formed and altered in moments of interruptive sensation
because these moments "invite occasions and actions for reconfiguring our associational
lives"); Deborah B. Gould, Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP's Fight against AIDS
46-47 (Chicago 2009) (arguing that emotions powerfully shape political views, behavior,
and activism); Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds, Passionate
Politics: Emotions and Social Movements 21 (Chicago 2001) (arguing that emotions help
explain the creation, trajectory, and decline of social movements); Simon Thompson and
Paul Hoggett, eds, Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies 4-7 (Continuum 2012) (arguing that emotions play a crucial role in human
reasoning capacities, political conflicts, social movements, political communication, policy making, and humanitarianism).
6
See, for example, Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries:A PoliticalArgument for an
Ethic of Care 162-65 (Routledge 1993) (arguing that the notion of care is important to
political ethics as a means of enhancing equality within democratic society); Virginia
Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political,and Global 81, 88 (Oxford 2006) (arguing
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never existed. To be sure, the book does engage a variety of different literatures, often with great depth and insight.7 Still, for
all its richness, many of Nussbaum's core insights-about the
importance of attending to the motivational supports of liberal
democracy, about the value of emotions in politics, and about the
challenges of directing civic engagement in ways that serve the
polity but also protect individual freedom-will seem familiar to
anyone who has been keeping up with central debates in political theory and philosophy. What she has to say on these matters
is generally quite sensible, but a good deal of this ground has
been covered by others, and the primary dilemmas have been
widely discussed.
Where the book truly departs from existing work is in its defense of love as the political emotion that matters most for the
stability of democratic societies and the pursuit of justice. Love
matters most, Nussbaum says, partly because "all of the core
emotions that sustain a decent society have their roots in, or are
forms of, love" (p 15). Partly too, love is the key because other
forms of affective engagement that are often associated with
democratic citizenship, such as "respect and even sympathy,"
are "insufficient and dangerously unstable" without love (p 165).
Yet the arguments Nussbaum offers here are less than fully
convincing. One difficulty has to do with the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the term "love" as it gets employed
throughout Political Emotions. Many different types of love are
included in the "political love" that Nussbaum champions, ranging from "the love of parents for children, the love of comrades,

that liberalism should be informed by the ethics of care in order to better account for the
social reality of considerable interdependence among individuals within their communities and the economy at large); Michael Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy 96-100
(Routledge 2007) (applying an "ethics of empathetic care" to the issue of distributive justice, and arguing that political institutions and decisions should display compassion);
Fiona Mackay, Love and Politics:Women Politiciansand the Ethics of Care 129-30 (Continuum 2001) (arguing that a political version of care ethics would correct an imbalance
in contemporary liberalism by informing political decision making with an improved
sensitivity to issues of care and challenging harmful policies motivated by interest
alone); Nel Noddings, Caring:A FeminineApproach to Ethics and Moral Education 3-6
(California 2d ed 2003) (proposing an ethics that is derived from a natural caring and a
recognition of our longing for human relation).
7
For example, Nussbaum explores Professor Paul Rozin's experimental work on
projective disgust in order to enrich Kant's concept of "radical evir' (pp 182-84). She also
addresses Professor Daniel Batson's idea that focused compassion generates particularistic favoritism by suggesting that compassionate love should be cultivated in an inclusive and generalized way while remaining "in dialogue with principles and general moral
norms" (pp 316-19).
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and romantic love" (pp 381-82) to the love of country embodied
in patriotism (pp 239, 249). Indeed, political love on Nussbaum's
view is "a family of sentiments, not a single emotion" (p 394).
And the family is a large one. It involves "kaleidoscopically
many feelings, actions, and reactions-including intense focus
on the other person, but also including the solitary cultivation of
one's own personal interests, and even sleep" (pp 319-20). By
the time we get to the cultivation of one's own personal interests
and sleep, the concept of love has grown too capacious to function as Nussbaum needs it to do. One's personal interests and
one's sleep may be objects of one's love, but that kind of love is a
far cry from the "altruistic" concern for others and its effectiveness in "prompting cooperative and unselfish behavior" that
makes love valuable for politics (p 382). Likewise, the claim that
"compassion, grief, fear, anger, [and] hope" all "have their roots
in, or are forms of, love" (p 15) is difficult to swallow.
What most matters to Nussbaum seems to be that "the public culture cannot be tepid and passionless, if good principles and
institutions are to survive" (p 320). "[P]eople's attitudes to one
another and the nation they inhabit" must be more than "dead
routine" (p 320). True enough. But why must it all come down to
love? The exceedingly extended family of emotions that Nussbaum includes under the rubric of "political love" is too broad. It
entails collapsing real distinctions between types of emotion and
running together forms of affective engagement that we need to
understand on their own terms if we are to mobilize them effectively. We do need an emotionally inspired political culture, but
we should acknowledge that such a culture requires many irreducibly diverse emotions, among which an important one (but
only one) is love.
Nor is it entirely clear that love is necessary for democratic
justice in the ways that Nussbaum believes. The role of love in
politics "comes in two stages," on her account (p 165). The first
stage is developmental. Drawing on studies in infant psychology
and early childhood development, Nussbaum argues that the
capacity to have concern for others arises from the "facilitating
environment" of parental love in early life and from the child's
own first experiences of love for his or her parents (pp 174-75).
It is "[o]nly love," she says, that "propels the infant into creative
reciprocity and the sort of empathetic perspective taking that
makes action an expression of genuine concern" for others
(pp 175-76). Love between parents and children is the catalyst
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for the later development of all the other-regarding capacities
that make an inspired political culture possible. For this reason,
"the political culture needs to tap these sources of early trust
and generosity ... if decent institutions are to be stably sustained" (p 177). The second stage at which love matters for justice comes in adulthood. For even when a person has successfully experienced the love that spawns the capacity for concern,
this capacity is regularly hindered by "persisting insecurities"
and by the narrowness of sympathy that is "inherent in our animal heritage" (p 165). Thus throughout our lives "love needs to
come to the rescue," here in the form of "a vigorous imaginative
engagement with another person's particularity" (p 165). This
imaginative engagement enables us to extend our circle of concern in more inclusive ways, to "undo or prevent the ravages of
group-based stigma and reveal citizens to one another as whole
and unique people" (p 165).
The idea that children need love to develop other-regarding
capacities is eminently sensible.8 This fact gives political communities a stake in the health and well-being of families.
Whether the state "needs to tap these sources of early trust and
generosity" (p 177) directly is not so clear, however. What the
state needs to tap is the developed capacities of adult citizens for
extended empathy and concern. In doing so, it engages capacities that would not have been possible originally without the facilitating presence of love, but it need not engage love directly.
For what it means to have become an adult, even on Nussbaum's
own view, is to have developed capacities for concern that extend
beyond and are independent of the particular context of personal
love in which they were first germinated (pp 181-82). These capacities are not reducible to love, even when love is broadly defined. It is true that Nussbaum equates love here with the "imaginative engagement with another person's particularity"
(p 165), but she regularly distinguishes love from sympathy,
compassion, empathy, and respect for persons, all of which involve (or could involve) imaginative engagement with another
person's particularity. This kind of imaginative engagement is
important for democratic citizenship, but it is not the same thing
as love. And even though the psychological capacity for such engagement may have its earliest sources in parental love, it is a mis8
See, for example, Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought at 190-200 (cited in note 3)
(discussing psychoanalytic literature on the development of other-regarding capacities in
infants).
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take to conclude that because we need citizens to be imaginatively
engaged with one another we also need them to love each other.
Nussbaum allows that political love is "polymorphous"
(p 381), and it may take for its objects political principles, practices, and institutions as well as people. But love of one's fellow
citizens does also seem to be crucial on her account. Consider
her insistence that a fair tax system needs the motivational
support of love if it is to be stable and effective. In "the absence
of love directed at one's fellow citizens and the nation as a
whole," she says, the laws and institutions that undergird a fair
system of taxation "will not sustain themselves" (p 214). Yet it
seems quite possible that a combination of motives other than
love could do the trick, and particularly love of one's fellow citizens. Why do we pay our taxes, after all? Some of us are afraid
of the IRS; others are too lazy or too busy to resist; and some
may be invested in the stability of the state for self-interested
reasons that have little to do with love of one's fellow citizens
and one's country. My hunch is that most citizens of more-or-less
just liberal democracies pay their taxes out of some combination
of these motives rather than out of the public love that Nussbaum points to here. 9 This is an empirical question, of course,
and one well worth exploring in light of Nussbaum's larger purposes. In any case, the example of a fair tax system does not
provide the kind of support Nussbaum needs to sustain the conclusion that love is a necessary support for a liberal democracy
aspiring to justice. 10
One reason why Nussbaum is so insistent on the importance
of love is that she has little faith in the efficacy of more standard
features of liberal moral psychology, above all impartiality. She

9 For an empirical study of motives for paying taxes, see James Alm, Gary H.
McClelland, and William D. Schulze, Why Do People Pay Taxes?, 48 J Pub Econ 21, 3536 (1992) (concluding that "individuals exhibit a remarkable diversity in behavior" with
regard to tax compliance).
10 Nussbaum might say that the fair tax system she has in mind involves more redistribution of wealth than the current US tax system. And she might point to the absence of this kind of tax system in the US as evidence that public love is necessary. Given her frequent attention to FDR and the New Deal in the book, she might also point to
the country's move away from the ideals of the New Deal in the latter half of the twentieth century as evidence that public love is lacking. Yet one could frame the same concern
in terms of an absence of solidarity and the sense of justice without necessarily bringing
in love. Or at least, the value added by bringing love in--over and above more familiar
sources of attachment and concern within liberal moral psychology-is not fully clear,
especially if these attachments are conceived (as they should be conceived) as being affectively engaged.
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criticizes Jurgen Habermas, for instance, for "his strong commitment to impartiality" (p 222). Although Habermas is right to
"see[ ] the need for some type of emotional support for good political principles," he is wrong to locate this support in the ideal of
"constitutional patriotism" (p 222).11 That ideal is marred by the
"excessive abstractness" (p 222) of its core commitment to impartiality, something that Nussbaum seems to regard as intrinsically antithetical to emotion. Yet without engaging Habermas's own work on constitutional patriotism or the meaning of
impartiality, she moves directly to a discussion of Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic philosopher and Roman emperor. Marcus's work,
she says, will tell us "how this commitment [to impartiality]
plays out in emotional terms" (p 222). "For Marcus, unlearning
partiality requires an elaborate and systematic program of uprooting concern for all people and things in this world" (p 223).
Impartiality therefore "means something like a death within
life" (p 224), for it "requires the extirpation of the eroticism that
makes human life the life we know," and it shuts out the emotions (p 225). As such, it could never support a liberal democracy
aspiring to justice. It is difficult to assess Habermas's theory of
constitutional patriotism on the basis of what Nussbaum tells us
about Marcus Aurelius. Habermas's view may indeed be flawed,
but what we learn about Marcus here sheds no light on that.12
And elsewhere Nussbaum calls attention to the value of "the
human capacity for impartiality" as something that overcomes
our natural "narrowness" and that forms "the core of mature
morality" (pp 156-57). Whatever the specific meaning of impartiality as defined by Habermas or Marcus Aurelius may be, as a
general matter there is no reason to think that impartiality
must oppose emotions. 13 Indeed, it is quite possible to conceive
impartiality in a way that acknowledges the importance of affective engagement on the part of citizens and even incorporates
emotional modes of consciousness directly.
11 For Habermas's discussion of impartiality and constitutional patriotism, see Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy 491-500, 511-12 (MIT 1996) (defending "constitutional patriotism,"
which views a state's political unity as organized around a common liberal political culture and constitution rather than around nationalist sentiment-and which depends on
assessing issues impartially) (emphasis omitted).
12 For a criticism of Habermas's theory of constitutional patriotism, see Morrell,
Empathy and Democracy at 76-84 (cited in note 5) (arguing that Habermas's dichotomy
between reason and affect undermines his attempt to incorporate empathy into his theory of constitutional patriotism).
13 See, for example, id at 164-67.
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III. IN DEFENSE OF AFFECTIVE IMPARTIALITY

What I mean to suggest is an ideal of affective impartiality
that satisfies Nussbaum's interest in emotions while also serving the liberal commitment to fairness. 14 Impartiality is a cornerstone of contemporary liberal theory because it insulates decision making from inequalities of power, from privilege and
prejudice, and guards against the interests of the less powerful
being sacrificed to those with more power. Impartial deliberation generates legitimate decisions because it instantiates the
core democratic value of equal respect. Although the literature
on democratic deliberation often presents the practice of impartiality as if it were antithetical to emotion, much as Nussbaum's
critique implies, impartiality need not excise emotions. Affective
impartiality in democratic deliberation requires two distinctive
practices that include sentiments and hence affective engagement. First, the arguments that citizens make in deliberating
about public matters are to be framed in terms of their shared
attachments to the constitutive principles of the political order,
attachments that are often referred to as "public reasons" (although the concept of public reason is often conceived, wrongly,
in ways that render it devoid of affect). Secondly, deliberation on
this view involves perspective taking in which citizens use empathy to affectively engage the sentiments of affected parties,
and incorporate the endorsable sentiments of those affected into
a generalized standpoint. Emotion therefore has two roles in
impartial deliberation: it involves affective attachment to public
principles and the desire to see them instantiated; and it requires identification with the sentiments of affected others in a
way that is simultaneously empathetic and critically informed.
Let me elaborate briefly on each.
Public reason has emotional content, although standard accounts of it usually fail to capture this content. To make use of
public reason in deliberation means framing one's arguments in
terms of public principles that are constitutive of the regime and
defining features of the political community. Such principles are
objects of shared concern and common attachment, things that
14 This paragraph and the three that follow are drawn from my prior book. See
Sharon R. Krause, Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation ch 5
(Princeton 2008). Civil Passions explores the faculties of heart and mind involved in deliberating about justice. It shows why political deliberation cannot avoid the passions, and
offers a systematic account of how passions, properly conceived, can generate an impartial
standpoint that makes democratic decisions both just and motivationally compelling.
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citizens care about. Public reasons embody the shared horizons
of concern that define the political culture of the polity and
shape the ethos of citizenship there. Such attachments are both
cognitive and affective. In the American context, the core concerns that define public reason include Americans' attachment
to the principles articulated in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. These attachments certainly do have intellectual content. We could not care about the principles of liberty and equality for all without sophisticated cognitive
capacities. And we have good reasons for caring about these
principles. Yet affective, emotional engagement is fundamental
to how we relate to them. The principles do more than simply
give cognitive meaning and intellectual order to our experience;
they also specify forms of interaction, such as equal respect and
reciprocity, which we care about and want to see brought to fruition in the world. Part of being a good citizen in this context is
precisely to be affectively engaged in this way. We have a conative, not merely a cognitive, orientation to public reasons, and
have emotional as well as intellectual attachments to them.
Public reasons therefore incorporate shared sentiments and
common concerns, and when we engage in public reasoning we
draw on faculties of both caring and reflection. Political deliberation that answers to public reason, so conceived, achieves the
impartiality needed to ensure the legitimacy and justice of the
decisions that result. It means that decisions will in principle be
endorsable by all because the decisions are justified in terms of
sentiments and concerns that all citizens, as citizens, are expected to share. Deliberation in this form is impartial insofar as
it treats those affected with equal respect. It does not privilege
the interests of some over those of others but rests on concerns
that are constitutive of the polity and are widely shared. It is
true that impartiality so conceived falls short of universalism, in
the sense that the principles guiding it will be tied to a particular political community and its specific defining ideals. Deliberation that answers to public reason, properly conceived, will be
impartial in the sense of being inclusive of different individuals
and groups of citizens, but it will be partial to the concerns that
are constitutive of the polity, and it will give special weight to
these concerns. This kind of public deliberation fosters the
greatest measure of impartiality we can hope for in politics, and
it does so while remaining affectively engaged.
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The perspective-taking dimension of affective impartiality is
also important. Perspective taking involves considering things
from the point of view of all those who are affected by the matter
under deliberation. The generalized standpoint that perspectivetaking effects is impartial insofar as it resists the domination of
any particular interests or private prejudices by incorporating
the legitimate sentiments of all. At the same time, because deliberation from this generalized standpoint involves thinking
and feeling with others, it is always an affectively engaged activity. It is important to see that not every sentiment that those affected may feel is properly included, however. To legitimately
claim a place in the generalized standpoint of impartial deliberation, an emotion or concern must itself be endorsable from
within a properly structured generalized standpoint, and it must
be compatible with the principles of public reason. Sentiments
based on ignorance of relevant facts should carry no weight, for
instance. Likewise, in deliberating about antidiscrimination
laws, we should not be moved by the pain a white supremacist
may feel as a result of increased racial justice. White supremacy
is fundamentally antithetical to the principles of freedom and
equality that are constitutive ideals of liberal democracy and
core features of public reason in the United States. Emotions
stimulated by racism have no legitimate place in impartial public deliberation. Sentiments that violate public reason or result
from factual mistakes could not reasonably be endorsed by those
they affect. In this respect, affective impartiality is a far cry
from blind empathy.
Impartiality need not be inconsistent with political emotions, then.15 We can make sense of impartiality in a way that
involves reflective sentiment and a form of practical reasoning
that is both cognitive and affective. Affective impartiality embodies the interpenetration of mind and heart in this regard. It
shows us one important way of being emotionally engaged in
politics insofar as it involves bringing our common concerns and
15 Nussbaum acknowledges that "the human capacity for impartiality" is "[a] crucial resource" for moral development (p 156), but she treats impartiality as a function of
principled reasoning that is distinct from perspective taking. Human beings, she says,
"have two systems of judgment: a system based in the imagination and perspectival
thinking, and a system grounded in principle" (p 157). The latter, which she refers to as
"impartial principle," should be in "dialogue" with the former, but the two are separate
faculties (p 157). On my view, impartiality itself includes both perspective taking and
attachment to principle, and both dimensions of impartiality involve affective modes of
consciousness.
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the sentiments of one another to bear in deliberation about matters of basic law and public policy. When emotions are properly
incorporated into public deliberation they serve rather than
thwart impartiality. The relationship between affective impartiality so conceived and liberal democracy is a reciprocal one.
Even as impartiality supports liberal democracy, it depends upon the presence of liberal-democratic institutions and on the informed and critical engagement they make possible. By establishing individual rights and the political conditions of equality
that force us to consider the sentiments of others, and by facilitating a wide-ranging deliberative system that brings a great diversity of sentiments onto the public stage, liberal democracy
has the potential to expand the imagination and educate the
emotions of citizens.
Citizens who are skilled in the feeling of impartiality can go
some distance toward providing the emotional supports that a
society aspiring to justice needs. Affective impartiality is not the
only way that political emotions matter, of course, and it does
not rule out the potential value of love in some forms. But it does
suggest that some of the important work that Nussbaum thinks
only love can accomplish actually may be achieved through other
forms of emotional engagement not reducible to love. It also
suggests that political emotion need not be conceived as antithetical to impartiality. And it may give us reason to hope that
some other liberal principles, including respect for persons and
the "principle-dependent emotions" that Nussbaum identifies in
Rawls (p 313), may be reconceived in ways that are emotionally
richer and affectively more dynamic than Nussbaum assumes
and than the existing literature lets on.
What all this amounts to is an argument for a somewhat
deeper pluralism of political emotions than what Nussbaum's
liberalism of love suggests. She is right to push liberals to take
love more seriously, and I hope the book will inspire further reflection on the meaning and value of love for politics. And to
Nussbaum's great credit, her argument for love never comes off
as excessively idealistic. Perhaps it is the wealth of concrete examples she gives and the book's insistent engagement with the
realities of human nature and political life. Perhaps it is the
many reminders of how pervasive love actually is in our lives, its
countless vitalities and multiple objects, which implicitly presses
the point that love is more abundant and more available, even
for political uses, than we typically think. Yet in making the

2014]

The Liberalism of Love

849

case for love, Nussbaum underestimates the independence and
the capabilities of other political emotions. There is plenty more
work to be done in elaborating the role of these emotions as they
figure in liberal-democratic societies aspiring to justice. Martha
Nussbaum is a towering figure in this domain and Political
Emotions is a major contribution. The liberalism of love it envisions boldly goes where liberal theory has always feared to
tread, and the vistas it brings into view stand to elevate us all.

